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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Case No. 990538-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee,
vs.

Priority No. 2

GILBERT ARVISO,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
* * *

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from a judgment of conviction for possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37A-5 (1998).
This Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
The following issues are presented to the Court for review, together with the
respective standards of appellate review:
FIRST ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the magistrate have a substantial basis for concluding

that the search warrant was supported by probable cause?
Standard of Review. Like the trial court, the appellate court "is bound by the contents
of the affidavit" and this Court will therefore not defer to the trial court's ruling on a
challenge to the warrant. State v. Weaver, 817 P.2d 830, 833 (Utah App. 1991). However,
in reviewing the sufficiency of an affidavit for a search warrant, the appellate court "accords

great deference to [the] magistrate's determination of probable cause." State v. Jordan, 665
P.2d 1280, 1286 (Utah), appeal dismissed, Fullmer v. Utah, 464 U.S. 910, 104 S.Ct. 266
(1983). The Court will not overturn the magistrate's decision unless "the magistrate, given
the totality of the circumstances, lacked a 'substantial basis' for determining that probable
cause existed." State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1993).
SECOND ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in not granting a

rehearing on defendant's search warrant challenge to allow defendant to further contest the
reliability and veracity of the confidential informant upon whom the warrant relied?
Standard ofReview. This Court should review the trial court's denial of defendant's
request for a rehearing of his suppression motion for an abuse of discretion. See State v.
Smith, 776 P.2d 929, 933 (Utah App. 1989) (reviewing for an abuse of discretion the trial
court's denial of a motion for a new trial alleging jury tampering and newly discovered
evidence); accord United States v. Hiveley, 61 F.3d 1358, 1360 (8th Cir. 1995) (reviewing
for an abuse of discretion a district court's refusal to hold an evidentiary hearing on a
challenge to a search warrant).
THIRD ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Did the trial court abuse its discretion in denying

defendant's motion for change of venue where defendant passed the jury for cause?
Standard ofReview. "A decision to deny or grant a motion for a change of venue is
within the discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent clear abuse of that
discretion." State v. Coyer, 814 P.2d 604, 608 (Utah App. 1991); accord State v. Pearson,
943 P.2d 1347, 1350 (Utah 1997).
2

FOURTH ISSUE ON APPEAL.

Was the evidence sufficient to support defendant's

conviction for possession of drug paraphernalia?
Standard of Review. The appellate court affords great deference to the jury verdict.
State v. Lamm, 606 P.2d 229,231 (Utah 1980). Accordingly, this Court will not reverse a
jury verdict for insufficient evidence unless "'the evidence to support the verdict was
completely lacking or was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly
unreasonable and unjust."' State v. Heaps, 2000 UT 5, f 19,386 Utah Adv. Rep. 31 (quoting
Child v. Gonda, 972 P.2d 425,433 (Utah 1998)). However, the Court will not entertain the
merits of an insufficiency claim if a defendant fails to marshal the evidence supporting the
jury's verdict. State v. Pilling, 875 P.2d 604,607-08 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Moore, 802
P.2d 732, 739 (Utah App. 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. AND RULES
The interpretation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution is
determinative of the appeal. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and
no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW

Six days after executing a search warrant, the State charged defendant by information
with possession of a controlled substance, a third degree felony, and possession of drug
3

paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R. 01-02,40. After he was bound over to stand trial,
defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized in the search. R. 19,42-43. After holding
a hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion and set the matter for trial. R. 51,55-56.
Defendant failed to appear for trial and the court issued a no-bail warrant for his
arrest. R. 63. Defendant was arrested nearly four months later in connection with an alleged
stabbing on November 4,1998. R. 211:7-8. Defendant's warrant in this case was thereafter
recalled and he was held on the charges in this matter without bail pending trial. R. 67-68,
76; R. 210: 2. Defendant moved for a change of venue alleging that adverse publicity had
contaminated the jury pool, jeopardizing his right to a fair trial. R. 88-91, 93-98. After a
hearing, the trial court denied defendant's motion. R. 119.
Defendant sought a rehearing on his motion to suppress, which was denied by the trial
court. R. 115-16,151. The jury found defendant guilty ofpossession of drug paraphernalia,
but acquitted him ofpossession of a controlled substance. R. 193-94. The court sentenced
defendant to a jail term of six months with credit for time served and defendant timely filed
a notice of appeal. R. 196, 198.
SUMMARY OF FACTS

Informant9s Arrest and Volunteered Information. In the late hours of Wednesday,
January 14,1998, Deputy Mike Stidham stopped Patty Bell for a traffic violation. R. 37: ^
2; R. 207:10.1 A consensual search of Bell's purse uncovered several syringes, a vial with
lr

The Affidavit for Search Warrant is found on pages 36-39 of the record on appeal
and is reproduced in Addendum A. Citations to the Affidavit include the index number
followed by the paragraph number designated in the Affidavit (e.g., R. 37: ^ 2).
4

wet cotton swabs, and three small baggies with a substance Bell identified as "crank"
cocaine. See R. 37: ^ 2-3. Bell was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute and transported to the Tooele City Police Department for questioning. See
R.37:14.
Information Concerning Defendant9s Drug Activities. Bell told police that although
she intended to sell the crank found in her purse, she purchases crystal methamphetamine for
personal use. R. 37: 3. She stated that defendant met with her that night, showing her
several baggies of methamphetamine. R. 37:4. Defendant was accompanied by an unknown
female, identified at trial as Kim Sant, who told Bell that she was cooking the
methamphetamine and that she and defendant would have some ready the following day. R.
37: If 4; R. 216: 198. Bell informed police that she had purchased methamphetamine from
defendant in the past and that she was confident he would have the substance for her. R. 38:
f 5. Bell advised police that defendant told her he was living with Jerry Dale Wood, who is
a known drug user, at 171 North Fifth Street in Tooele. R. 38: Tf 6; R. 39. Bell also indicated
that defendant always carried a firearm. R. 38.
Bell volunteered to make controlled buys of illegal drugs from persons in Tooele
County, including defendant, in exchange for "consideration" in reducing the charges against
her. See R. 37:11; R. 38: 5. Accordingly, under the direction of the police, Bell called
defendant early Thursday morning to arrange a controlled buy from defendant. See R. 38:
Transcripts in the record, such as the preliminary hearing, will also include the index
number followed by the internal page number of the transcript (e.g., R. 207: 10). The
Search Warrant is reproduced in Addendum B.
5

15. However, someone else answered the telephone and told Bell to call back later because
defendant was asleep. R. 38: 5.
Search of Defendant's Residence. Based on the foregoing information, police
presented an Affidavit for Search Warrant to the magistrate for his review. R. 36-39
(Addendum A). After finding probable cause, the magistrate issued the Search Warrant early
that Thursday morning. R. 40; R. 216: 92; see Addendum B.
With warrant in hand, officers from the Tooele City Police Department entered Jerry
Wood's house at approximately 7:00 Thursday morning. R. 216: 92-94, 189. Inside the
house, police found defendant, his girlfriend ReNae Weakland, her 18-year-old daughter
Carrie Van, and Jerry Wood. R. 216: 94, 100-01, 110, 184-85, 189. When police arrived,
defendant was alone in the front bedroom and Weakland was in the kitchen. R. 216:94,10001,110,190. Although Weakland and defendant shared the front bedroom, Weakland was
in the process of moving out. R. 216: 112, 189-91, 228. Weakland had spent most of
Wednesday alone at a storage unit separating her belongings from those of defendant. R.
216: 191. She returned to the house briefly after defendant and his companion, Kim Sant,
had taken her to Grantsville to pick up her car. R. 216: 191. Weakland left the house at
approximately 10:30 Wednesday evening and did not return until shortly before police
entered the house Thursday morning to conduct the search. R. 216: 191.2

2

Weakland testified that in the twenty-four hours immediately preceding the
search, she was with defendant no more than one hour (when defendant and Sant picked
her up and at the house before she left at 10:30 Wednesday evening). R. 216: 193.
6

Among the miscellaneous personal effects and clothes in defendant's bedroom, police
found a potpourri of drug paraphernalia. R. 216: 94, 101-02, 108, 112, 189, 228.3 Items
seized from defendant's bedroom included a number of glass pipes, a hand-made wood pipe,
two cigarette lighters, two butane refill canisters, two small measuring scales in a drill case,
a yellow propane tank with two pencil torches, a gym bag containing two micro-torches and
a brown glass bottle, and the top portion oftwo light bulbs. R.216:96-97,102-03,118-20,
121-25, 127, 163-67, 169, 215. Police also seized a baggie containing methamphetamine
residue from a jewelry box in the bedroom. R. 216: 86-89, 116, 142.4
Nature of Evidence Seized. The glass pipes seized from the bedroom were of a kind
commonly used to smoke controlled substances. R. 216:119,225-26,228-29. At least two
of the glass pipes were burnt in a manner consistent with smoking methamphetamine, as
Were the broken light bulbs. R. 216: 118-19, 122-24. As is the case with most pipes used
to smoke drugs, the wood pipe was hand-made. R. 216:120.5 Cigarette lighters and butane
or propane torches are commonly used to heat up crystal methamphetamine until it turns into
a liquid and can be inhaled. R. 216: 226, 228-29; see also R. 216: 220. The brown glass
bottle found in the gym bag contained a crystalline substance and the measuring scales were

3

Although some women's clothes and personal effects were in the bedroom, most
of the clothes in the bedroom were men's clothes. R. 216: 102, 108.
4

The methamphetamine in the baggie was the basis for the controlled substance
charge of which defendant was acquitted. R. 216: 257.
5

Officer Wade Russell testified that he has yet to find a commercially-made
smoking pipe with a controlled substance in it. R. 216: 120.
7

of a type commonly used to weigh and separate controlled substances. R. 216:121-22; see
also R. 216: 222.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Sufficiency of the Search Warrant Affidavit. Contrary to defendant's argument on
appeal, the magistrate had a substantial basis for concluding that probable cause existed to
support the search warrant. The search warrant affidavit included information from an
informant with first hand knowledge that defendant possessed methamphetamine and was
prepared to sell her the drug. Although the informant sought favor with police, her statement
against penal interest lent credibility to her allegations, as did her willingness to participate
in a controlled buy. Moreover, confirmation that defendant was at the house to be searched,
which was owned by a known drug user, added to the reliability of the information. Even
if the warrant were invalidated, the officer relied on the warrant in good faith and the
evidence was therefore properly admitted.
Request for Rehearing on Motion to Suppress. An evidentiary hearing on a challenge
to a search warrant is only appropriate if the challenger alleges deliberate falsehood, reckless
disregard for the truth, or a deliberate omission that would have affected the probable cause
determination. Defendant failed to meet this burden and the trial court did not, therefore,
abuse its discretion in denying the hearing.
Motion for Change of Venue. A change of venue for adverse pretrial publicity is
appropriate only if defendant can show a reasonable likelihood that he could not receive a
fair trial unless venue is changed. To successfully challenge the trial court's refusal to
8

change venue, defendant must show actual prejudice. Defendant fails to do so. Defendant
passed the jury for cause, thereby waiving any claim of prejudice, and he does not allege on
appeal any actual prejudice. Moreover, the jury's acquittal of defendant on the more serious
felony charge belies any claim that he was not tried by a fair and impartial jury.
Sufficiency of the Evidence. On a claim of insufficiency of the evidence, the
defendant mustfirstmarshal the evidence in support of the jury verdict and then demonstrate
that the evidence was insufficient when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.
Defendant has wholly failed to meet the marshaling requirement and this Court should not
review his claim. In any case, the evidence was more than sufficient to support the jury's
verdict.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE MAGISTRATE HAD A SUBSTANTIAL BASIS FOR CONCLUDING
THAT THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE
CAUSE.
In his first claim of error, defendant contends that the search warrant was not

supported by probable cause. Aplt. Brf. at 1,12. He asserts that the confidential informant
referred to in the affidavit, Patty Bell ("CI"), was not reliable and that police failed to verify
her information or otherwise obtain corroborating evidence. Aplt. Brf. at 14-22. Defendant
acknowledges that probable cause is judged under the "totality of the circumstances"
standard adopted by the Supreme Court in Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 2332 (1983). However, his technical dissection of the affidavit more closely
approximates the more rigid approach applied by the courts before the decision in Gates.
9

A.

Probable Cause Is Assessed Under the Totality-of-the-Circumstances.

Probable cause arises from "the factual and practical considerations of everyday life
on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Gates, 462 U.S. at 241,
103 S.Ct at 2333. Accordingly, "[t]he task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a
practical, common-sense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in the
affidavit before him,... there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will
be found in a particular place." Id. at 238, 103 S.Ct. at 2332; State v. Singleton, 854 P.2d
1017, 1020 (Utah App. 1993) (applying the Gates totality-of-the-circumstances analysis
standard to probable cause determinations).
Although the basis of the informant's knowledge and the informant's reliability are
relevant factors in determining probable cause under the totality of the circumstances, they
are no longer rigid prerequisites to a probable cause determination as they were treated in
decisions prior to Gates. 462 U.S. at 233, 103 S.Ct. at 2329. As observed by the Supreme
Court in Gates, "a deficiency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some other indicia of
reliabilityr Id. at 229-30 & n. 4, 103 S.Ct. at 2327-28 & n. 4 (emphasis added).
On appeal, this Court pays "great deference" to the magistrate's finding of probable
cause. Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833; accord State v. Hansen, 732 P.2d 127, 129 (Utah 1987).
Accordingly, "after-the-fact scrutiny... should not take the form of de novo review." Gates,
462 U.S. at 236,103 S.Ct. at 2331. The appellate court's deference to the magistrate is due
in large measure to "the Fourth Amendment's strong preference for searches conducted
10

pursuant to a warrant." Id.; accord Weaver, 817 P.2d at 833. Given this preference for the
warrant process, appellate courts will not invalidate a search warrant so long as "the
magistrate had a 'substantial basis for concluding]' that probable cause existed" to conduct
asearch. Id. at 238-39,103 S.Ct. at 2332 (quoting Jones v. UnitedStates, 362 U.S. 257,271,
80 S.Ct. 725, 736 (I960)).
B.

The Search Warrant Was Supported by Probable Cause.

An examination of the warrant in this case reveals that the magistrate had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed. The Affidavit for Search Warrant,
reproduced in Addendum A, sets forth the following facts:
(1) A confidential informant ("CI"), now known to be Patty Bell, was
stopped for a traffic offense, R. 37: Tf 2;
(2) . A search of the CI's purse uncovered several syringes, a vial with
wet cotton swabs, and three small baggies containing a substance the CI
identified as crank (cocaine), R. 37:fflf2-3;
(3) The CI was arrested for possession of a controlled substance with
intent to distribute, R. 37: f 3;
(4) The CI told police that she only buys the crank to sell it, but that she
personally "uses" crystal meth because it is a better product, R. 37: % 3;
(5) The CI told police that "she has purchased from [defendant] in the
past, and is confident that he will have the [drugs] for her, R. 38: f 5;
(6) The CI told police that late that evening (Wednesday, January 14,
1998) defendant met with her and showed her several baggies of
methamphetamine, R. 37: % 4;
(7) The CI told police that defendant was accompanied by an
unidentified female when he approached the CI, R. 37: f 4;
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(8) The CI indicated that the unidentified female told her "that she was
cooking, and that 'they' will have some ready to sell" the following day, R. 37:
14;

(9) The CI volunteered to make controlled buys under police direction
from persons in Tooele County in exchange for consideration in reducing the
drug-related offense for which she was being investigated, R. 37: f 1;
(10) Defendant told the CI that he lived with Jerry Dale Wood at 171
North 5th Street in Tooele, Utah, R. 38:16;
(11) Jerry Dale Wood is a known drug user, R. 38: J 6; and
(12) Under the direction of the police, the CI called defendant to arrange
a buy but was asked by the person who answered the telephone to call back
later because defendant was sleeping, R. 38: % 5.
Admittedly, the information upon which the search warrant relied did not come from
an inherently reliable source such as a disinterested citizen who "volunteered] information
out of concern for the community/9 State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990).
As a police informant, the CI here is concededly lower on the reliability scale. State v.
McArthur, 2000 UT App. 23, U 31,388 Utah Adv. Rep. 38. However, when viewed in "it's
entirety and in a common-sense fashion," State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1102 (Utah
1985), the affidavit provided sufficient information to establish a fair probability that
contraband would be found in defendant's residence.
Personal Observations of the Informant. The affidavit included a number of
allegations of the CI based on her own personal experience and observations. The CI told
police that defendant had sold her methamphetamine in the past. R. 38: 5. She told police
that defendant showed her several baggies of methamphetamine when he met with her late
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that Wednesday evening. R. 37: f 4. Moreover, she indicated that the unknown woman who
accompanied defendant that evening told her she was cooking methamphetamine and that
"they would have some ready to sell" the following day. R. 37: 4. Having purchased
methamphetamine from defendant in the past, the CI was therefore confident that defendant
would have the methamphetamine for her. R. 38: f 5. Statements of an informant based on
personal observation, such as those of the CI in this case, have consistently been regarded
as a factor which tends to heighten credibility. See State v. Potter, 860 P.2d 952,956 (Utah
App. 1993) (recognizing that "[c]ourts have... consistently approved the issuance of search
warrants where the informant's knowledge is based on personal observation"); State v.
Purser, 828 P.2d 515, 517 (Utah App. 1992).
Defendant contends that because the CI had not seen the baggies of methamphetamine
at his residence, but instead saw them on his person, nothing in the affidavit supported the
inference that contraband would be found at the residence. Aplt. Brf. at 19,25-26. However,
as aptly noted by defendant in his brief, a very short period of time elapsed between the CI's
arrest and the search. The CI stated that defendant had shown her several baggies of
methamphetamine late Wednesday evening, January 14, 1998. See R. 37: ^ 4. The police
arrested the CI sometime after and they executed the search warrant at approximately 7:00
Thursday morning, January 15, 1998. R. 37:12; R. 216: 92-94, 189.6 Accordingly, the

6

Although the time of the search is not apparent from the copy of the search
warrant that is part of the record on appeal, see R. 40, Officer Fowler testified that the
warrant was executed between 7:00 and 7:30 Thursday morning. R. 216: 92. The time
the magistrate signed the warrant is certainly a fact of which he was cognizant at the time.
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magistrate knew that probably no more than nine hours had passed, at the very most, since
defendant had been carrying methamphetamine.
"[T]he magistrate need not decide whether it is more likely that the evidence is
elsewhere/' but instead, he need only decide whether there is a fair probability it will be
found as the specified location. Weaver$\l P.2d at 833. The lateness of the hour when
defendant showed the CI the drugs, the earliness of the hour when police sought the warrant,
and the fact defendant was known to be asleep at his residence just hours after his encounter
with the CI, lead to the "common-sense conclusion^ about human behavior" that defendant
still had the drugs and paraphernalia on his person or at his residence. See Gates, 462 U.S.
at 231-32, 103 S.Ct. at 2328-29. This conclusion is supported by the fact that in general,
people retire when it is late, sleep through the night, and store their belongings at their
residence. These "common-sense conclusions" constitute the benchmark of probable cause.
Moreover, defendant showed the CI the methamphetamine in ready-to-sell baggies
and the unidentified female said "they" would have some ready to sell the next day. From
these facts and their common-sense inferences, the magistrate reasonably concluded that
defendant's residence was a logical place to look for the evidence, including the
"methamphetamine,[ ] paraphernalia evidencing the use, packaging, and storing of the
same," and "[s]cales for the weighing of controlled substances and packaging materials, in
the form of small plastic zip lock type baggies usually used in dividing the controlled
substances into individual use quantities." R. 39:fflf1, 3; see People v. Tuadles, 7 Cal.
App.4th 1777, 9 Cal. Rptr.2d 780 (Cal. App. 1992) (observing that "numerous cases have
14

held if there was probable cause to believe the defendant was dealing drugs there was
probable cause to believe drugs or other evidence of such criminal activity would be found
in defendant's residence even where there was no evidence defendant was dealing drugs
from that residence").
Defendant nominally objects to the sufficiency of the affidavit on the grounds that it
largely relies on the hearsay statements of the confidential informant, Patty Bell. See Aplt.
Brf. at 1. The law is well-settled, however, that "[a]n affidavit may be based on hearsay
information and need not reflect the direct personal observation of the affiant, so long as the
magistrate is informed of some of the underlying circumstances supporting the conclusions."
Jordan, 665 P.2d at 1286.
Statement Against Penal Interest Furthermore, the CI's statements carried indicia
of reliability. The CI admitted to selling crack cocaine as well as to the personal use of
crystal methamphetamine-a drug not found in her possession. R. 37: ^f 3. Such statements
against penal interest add to an informant's credibility because individuals do not blithely
admit to criminal conduct. See United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573,583-84,91 S.Ct. 2075,
2082 (1971) (Burger, C.J., lead opinion) (observing that "[p]eople do not lightly admit a
crime and place critical evidence in the hands of the police in the form of their own
admissions"). While recognizing that admissions implicating another do not always lend
credibility to the statement, Chief Justice Burger concluded that "[c]ommon sense in the
important daily affairs of life would induce a prudent and disinterested observer to credit
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these statements." Id. at 583,91 S.Ct. at 2082.7 He continued, noting that "[ajdmissions of
crime, like admissions against proprietary interests, carry their own indicia of
credibility-sufficient at least to support a finding of probable cause to search." Id. at 583,
91 S.Ct. at 2082.
Numerous federal circuit courts have cited to Chief Justice Burger's opinion in
support of the conclusion that statements against penal interest add to an informant's
credibility. See, e.g., United States v. Leidner, 99 F.3d 1423, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996), cert,
denied, 520 U.S. 1169,117 S.Ct. 1434 (1997) (finding that defendant's credibility increased
when he admitted to having made drug deliveries for another); United States v. Wilson, 964
F.2d 807, 810 (8th Cir. 1992) (holding that the informant's veracity was supported by his
admission to drug agents that he was heavily involved in drug trafficking); United States v.
Rowell, 903 F.2d 899, 903 (2nd Cir. 1990) (observing that "the reliability of one of the
informants is indicated by his statement, made against his penal interest, that he had
personally purchased cocaine from [defendant]"). That the CI was also attempting to gamer
favor with the police does not significantly diminish the import ofher statement against penal
interest. As observed by the Ninth Circuit, "[ejven when an informant is promised payment
or a 'break' there remains the 'residual risk and opprobrium of having admitted criminal

7

Part III of Chief Justice Burger's opinion, discussing the effect of an informant's
admissions on his credibility, was joined by Justices Black, Blackmun, and White.
Harris, 403 U.S. at 574-75, 585-86, 91 S.Ct. at 2077-78, 2083. Justice Stewart concurred
in the judgment but did not join Part III of the opinion. Id. However, Justice Stewart
joined in Part I where the Court cited to the informant's declaration against interest as a
factor evidencing the informant's credibility. Id. at 579-80, 91 S.Ct. 2080.
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conduct.'" United States v. Dozier, 844 F.2d 701,707 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 488 U.S. 927,
109 S.Ct. 312 (1988) (quoting Harris, 403 U.S. at 583-84, 91 S.Ct at 2082).
Other Indicia of Reliability. Police, however, did not simply take the CI's word at
face value. * Indeed, her credibility was initially tested when she tried to arrange a controlled
buy from defendant. Although her attempt fell short because defendant was asleep, it
bolstered the CI's credibility by demonstrating her willingness to go forward with a buy
knowing full well that any consideration for reducing her charges would likely be lost if her
claim was spurious. See Bates v. City of Fort Wayne, 591 F.Supp. 711,720 (N.D. Ind. 1983)
(holding that the informant's "participation in [two] controlled buys establishes her
credibility"). Defendant contends that the CI "had everything to gain by giving information
to the police, whether it was accurate or not." Aplt. Brf. at 14. To the contrary, should an
informant "lie to the police, [he] risks disfavor with the prosecution. ' [0]ne who knows the
police are already in a position to charge him with a serious crime will not likely undertake
to divert the police down blind alleys.'" United States Davis, 617 F.2d 677, (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert, denied, Gelestino v. United States, 445 U.S. 967,100 S.Ct. 1659 (1980) (quoting 1 W.
LaFave, Search and Seizure § 3.3, at 528 (1978)).
Defendant points out that the attempted controlled buy occurred in the early morning
hours of the day, sometime before 7:00 a.m. "when ordinary citizens are expected to be
asleep." Aplt. Brf. at 19. However, contrary to defendant's claim, Aplt. Brf. at 21, such a
failure to make a buy at that early hour did not cast doubt on the information provided by the
CI because, like ordinary citizens, drug dealers may also reasonably be expected to be asleep.
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Corroborating Evidence. Although defendant points to the lack of corroborating
evidence of his criminal behavior, see Aplt. Brf. at 19-21, the proper focus is not whether the
criminal behavior is corroborated, but "whether the actions of the suspects, whatever their
nature, give rise to an inference that the informant is credible and that [s]he obtained [her]
information in a reliable manner." Wilson, 964 F.2d at 809 (quoting Gates, 462 U.S. at 269,
103 S.Ct. at 2349 (White, J., concurring)). A review of the affidavit reveals that some of the
information provided by the CI was indeed corroborated. For example, the CI indicated that
defendant had told her he lived with Jerry Wood. R. 38: ^f 6. That defendant did, in fact, live
with Wood and was presently at the residence was corroborated when the CI called Wood's
residence under the direction of the police and was told that defendant was sleeping. R. 38:
15.
Another factor lending corroboration to the CI's allegations was the fact that
defendant lived with a known drug user. R. 38: f 6. Although Wood's status as a drug user
did not establish the presence of controlled substances at defendant's residence, see Potter,
860 P.2d at 956, it did serve to corroborate the CI's information that defendant was
implicated in the drug scene. As aptly observed by Chief Justice Burger in Harris, "a
policeman's knowledge ofa suspect's reputation-something that policemenfrequentlyknow
. . . -is [] a 'practical consideration of everyday life' upon which an officer (or magistrate)
may properly rely in assessing the reliability of an informant's tip." Harris, 403 U.S. at 583,
91 S.Ct. at 2081-82 (Burger, C.J., lead opinion, Black, J. and Blackmun, J. concurring).
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C.

Admission of the Evidence Seized in the Search Was Also Warranted
Under the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule.

Even if the Court were to conclude that the affidavit did not establish probable cause,
admission of the evidence is nevertheless justified under the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule enunciated in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,104 S.Ct. 3405 (1984).
The Supreme Court in Leon held that evidence seized pursuant to a subsequently invalidated
warrant is admissible in court where the officers conducting the search acted in good faith
reliance on the warrant. Id. at 922, 104 S.Ct. 3420; accord Potter, 860 P.2d at 958. The
Supreme Court established this good faith exception because the remedial objectives of the
exclusionary rule-to deter police misconduct-are not served where police reasonably rely
on a warrant issued by a neutral magistrate. Leon, 468 U.S. at 918-19, 104 S.Ct. at 3418.
Rather than always relying on an exception to the warrant requirement, officers are
encouraged to seek the decision of a neutral magistrate on the matter. In the ordinary case,
"an officer cannot be expected to question the magistrate's probable-cause determination or
his judgment that the form of the warrant is technically sufficient. '[0]nce the warrant
issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the
law.'" Id. at 921, 104 S.Ct. at 3419.
Given the Constitution's strong preference for warrants, '"searches pursuant to a
warrant will rarely require any deep inquiry into reasonableness,' for 'a warrant issued by
a magistrate normally suffices to establish' that a law enforcement officer has 'acted in good
faith in conducting the search.'" Id. at 922, 104 S.Ct. at 3420 (citations omitted). Only
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where a defendant can establish that the officer's reliance on the warrant was not objectively
reasonable will the good faith exception not apply.
The Court in Leon identified four circumstances in which good faith will not be found:
(1) "where the issuing magistrate wholly abandoned his judicial role," becoming in effect a
member of the search party team; (2) where the warrant was so facially deficient, "failing to
particularize the place to be searched or the things to be seized[,] that the executing officers
cannot reasonably presume it to be valid;" (3) where the affidavit included deliberate
material omissions or misrepresentations "that the affiant knew [were] false or would have
known [were] false except for his reckless disregard of the truth;" and (4) where the affidavit
was "'so lacking in indicia of probable cause as to render official belief in its existence
entirely unreasonable.'" Leon, 468 U.S. at 921-22,104 S.Ct. at 3420-21 (citations omitted);
accord State v. Lee, 863 P.2d 49, 55 (Utah App. 1993), State v. Horton, 848 P.2d 708,711
(Utah App.), cert denied, 857 P.2d 948 (Utah 1993).
None of the four circumstances exist here. Nothing in the record suggests, nor does
defendant intimate, that the magistrate participated in the search or otherwise abandoned his
role as a neutral, judicial officer. Nor does defendant complain that the warrant failed to
identify with sufficient particularity the place to be searched and the items to be seized. In
addition, nothing in the record suggests that the magistrate was misled by police. Defendant
suggested this in his Motion to Suppress, but he never identified any information that was
either false or that was omitted and which would have affected the probable cause
determination. See R. 19, 42-43. On appeal, defendant contends that the trial court failed
20

to consider that the CI was a known drug user and dealer and that she was using drugs every
day at the time of her arrest. Aplt. Brf. at 14-15. These facts, however, are apparent from
a fair reading of the affidavit. The affidavit indicated that the CI admitted to dealing crank
and that she uses crystal methamphetamine. R. 37: f 3. The fair import of these statements
is that the CI was both a drug dealer and a drug user who is likely to use drugs frequently.
Moreover, nothing in the record supports the conclusion that the police knew or could have
known howfrequentlythe CI used drugs.
Defendant also contends that the trial court should have considered a number of other
factors, not on the record. Defendant alleges that the CI's drug addiction prompted the Utah
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) to investigate her for child neglect on three
occasions, once resulting in the State taking custody of her children. Aplt. Brf. at 15-16.
Defendant also alleges that the CI's husband had committed suicide and she was in a state
of chronic depression. Aplt. Brf. at 16. These allegations are unsubstantiated and are not
supported by the record. Accordingly, this Court should not consider them on appeal. See
State v. Pliego, 1999 UT 8, % 7, 974 P.2d 279 (holding that the Court "will not consider
evidence which is not part of the record).8 Even if these unsubstantiated allegations were
supported by the record, they simply relate to the CI's drug problem which was already
apparentfromthe affidavit itself. They add nothing to the claim that the information in the
affidavit was unreliable. Because the affidavit makes clear that defendant was both a drug
dealer and a drug user, it cannot be said that the magistrate was misled in any way by police.
8

The State has filed with its brief a motion to strike material not part of the record.
21

Finally, the affidavit in this case was not "so lacking in indicia of probable cause as
to render official belief in its existence entirely unreasonable." Horton, 848 P.2d at 711
(citing Leon, 468 U.S. at 923, 104 S.Ct. at 3421). As explained above, a review of the
affidavit under the totality of the circumstances reveals that the magistrate had a substantial
basis to find probable cause. The information in the affidavit was not so lacking that "no
well-trained officer could reasonably have thought that a warrant should issue." Gates, 462
U.S. at 264,103 S.Ct. at 2346 (White, J., concurring).
In sum, the officers relied in good faith on the search warrant. Accordingly, even if
this were a case where reasonable minds could differ, Leon, 468 U.S. at 914, 104 S.Ct. at
3416, admission of the evidence under the good faith exception comports with the
constitutional "preference to be accorded to warrants." United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S.
102, 109, 85 S.Ct. 741, 746 (1965).
II.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S REQUEST FOR A REHEARING ON HIS MOTION TO
SUPPRESS.
Defendant next claims that the trial court erred in denying his request for a rehearing

on the original motion to suppress. Aplt. Brf. at 29. Defendant contends that after learning
the identity of the confidential informant (Patty Bell), "he should have been granted the
opportunity to present evidence concerning her reliability and veracity." Aplt. Brf. at 29.
Defendant's claim is without merit.9
defendant cites State v. Brown, 798 P.2d 284, 286 (Utah App. 1990), in support
of his proposition. Although an evidentiary hearing was held in Brown, that case does not
address the circumstances under which an evidentiary hearing is required.
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An affidavit supporting a search warrant enjoys a "presumption of validity." Franks
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154,171,98 S.Ct. 2674,2684 (1978). As such, the reviewing court
will not look beyond the four corners of the affidavit except in limited circumstances. See
United States v. Leftkowitz, 618 F.2d 1313,1317 (9th Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 824,101
S.Ct. 86 (1980). In Franks, the Supreme Court held that a reviewing court should hold an
evidentiary hearing only if defendant alleges deliberate falsehood or reckless disregard for
the truth. Franks, 438 U.S. at 171,98 S.Ct. at 2684. Deliberate omissions that would affect
the probable cause determination may also justify a hearing. Lee, 863 P.2d at 55; State v.
Neilsen, 727 P.2d 188,191 (Utah 1986), cert, denied, 480 U.S. 930,107 S.Ct. 1565 (1987).
In this case, defendant has not alleged deliberate falsehood, reckless disregard for the
truth, or wanton omissions of material facts. Instead, defendant simply argues that upon
learning the CFs identity, "he should have been granted the opportunity to present evidence
concerning her reliability and veracity." Aplt. Brf. at 29. A defendant's attack "must be
more than conclusory and must be supported by more than a mere desire to cross-examine."
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684. Allowing defendant to open up the trial court's
review of the affidavit in this manner would have been error and the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to do so. Moreover, "[t]he deliberate falsity or reckless disregard
whose impeachment is permitted [in an evidentiary hearing] is only that of the affiant, not
of any nongovernmental informant." Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684.
As stated, defendant has not identified any deliberate misrepresentations or omissions
by the police in the affidavit nor has he alleged a deliberate disregard for the truth. Id.
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(holding that the challenger must specifically identify and explain the misrepresentations).10
Because defendant failed to show that he met the requirements for an evidentiary hearing
under Franks, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the hearing.
III.

DEFENDANT WAIVED ANY CHALLENGE TO THE TRIAL COURT'S
DENIAL OF HIS MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF VENUE WHEN HE PASSED
THE JURY FOR CAUSE.
Defendant's third claim on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion

for change of venue. Whether a motion for a change of venue should be granted or denied
lies within the sound discretion of the trial court and "this Court will not disturb that decision
unless an abuse of discretion is shown." State v. James, 161 P.2d 549,551 (Utah 1989). To
succeed on a motion for change of venue, the defendant must demonstrate that a reasonable
likelihood exists that he cannot receive a fair trial in the county in which the offense was
committed. Id. at 552. On appeal, therefore, u[t]he ultimate test of whether a denial to
change venue constitutes an abuse of discretion is whether a defendant was tried by a fair and
impartial jury." Cayer, 814 P.2d at 608. An examination of the record in this case reveals
that defendant did, in fact, receive a fair trial.
In assessing the potential prejudicefrompretrial publicity, the trial court reviews the
totality of the circumstances, with particular attention to: "(1) the standing of the victim and
the accused in the community; (2) the size of the community; (3) the nature and gravity of
the offense; and (4) the nature and extent of publicity." Id. However, this Court need not
10

The Court further explained that "[affidavits or sworn or otherwise reliable
statements of witnesses should be furnished, or their absence satisfactorily explained."
Franks, 438 U.S. at 171, 98 S.Ct. at 2684.
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even review the trial court's consideration of these factors if defendant "fail[s] to show that
he was actually prejudiced by the trial court's denial of his motion for change of venue."
State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004,1008 (Utah App. 1994); accord State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439,
459 (Utah 1988) (holding that "defendant has the burden of demonstrating the existence of
actual prejudice on his appeal"). Defendant in this case "has not even begun to satisfy his
burden." Bishop, 753 P.2d at 459.
First, defendant passed the jury for cause and did not renew his motion for change of
venue based on adverse publicity. R. 216: 57-58.l ] Having failed to preserve his challenge,
he in effect waived any claim of actual prejudice due to pretrial publicity. See Pearson, 943
P.2d at 1350 (finding no abuse of discretion where defendant passed the jury panel for cause
and failed to renew his motion for change of venue).
Second, defendant has not alleged that any one juror formed an opinion about
defendant's guilt before the trial. See Aplt. Brf. at 32-35. Even though none of the panel
members indicated that they had read or heard anything about the case in the newspaper,
defendant baldly opines that "[i]t seems inconceivable that throughout the course of the day,
not one of the jury members would have remembered reading any of the three articles in
which Mr. Arviso was mentioned so prominently." Aplt. Brf. at 35. Even if true, such an

u

In passing the jury for cause, defense counsel preservedhis challenge to the jury
on the ground that it was "not racially mixed in a proportion equal to the racial mixture of
the Tooele County population as a whole." R. 163; R. 216: 57-58. However, defendant
has not challenged on appeal the trial court's denial of that challenge and for good reason.
See State v. Price, 909 P.2d 256,261 (Utah App. 1995), cert denied, 916 P.2d 909 (Utah
1996) (holding that a defendant is not entitled to a jury of any particular composition).
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allegation falls far short of demonstrating actual prejudice. See Coyer, 814 P.2d at 610
(holding that "the fact that some jurors had knowledge of the case from media counts is not
sufficient, by itself, to establish prejudice"). Moreover, that no juror remembered reading
anything about defendant appears very likely since all three articles appeared in the
newspaper more than five months before the trial and none discussed defendant on the front
page. See R. 93-96.
In any case, a review of the four factors in James does not support defendant's claim
that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for change of venue. Although
the size of the community is relatively small, the crime was a "victimless" crime involving
the possession of drugs and paraphernalia, which did not become "embedded in the public
consciousness" as was the case in James. 767 P.2d at 553. Although defendant is Hispanic,
that fact does not appear to have been readily apparent. See R. 216:19 (prosecutor indicating
that he was unaware that defendant was Hispanic). Furthermore, the offense was not of a
heinous or otherwise egregious nature and what limited pretrial publicity existed was almost
six months old and was never "front page" news. See R. 93-96. Consideration of these
factors, therefore, supports the trial court's denial of defendant's motion for change of venue.
Finally, the very fact that defendant was acquitted of the more serious charge belies
the notion that defendant suffered prejudice from the trial court's denial of his motion for
change of venue. Given the jury's ultimate willingness to acquit defendant of the felony
charge, it cannot be logically argued that the trial court abused its discretion in concluding
that it was not reasonably likely that defendant could not receive a fair trial.
26

IV.

THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S
CONVICTION FOR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.
Defendant's final claim is that the evidence was insufficient to sustain a conviction

for possession of drug paraphernalia. Aplt. Brf at 36. "To demonstrate that the evidence
is insufficient to support [a] jury verdict, the one challenging the verdict must [first] marshal
the evidence in support of the verdict and then demonstrate that the evidence is insufficient
when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict.'9' State v. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f
14, 899 P.2d 1065 (quoting Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 789, 799 (Utah 1991));
see also Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) (providing that "[a] party challenging a fact finding must
first marshal all record evidence that supports the challenged finding"). Defendant has failed
to meet this marshaling requirement and his claim must therefore fail.
The only evidence defendant identifies as supporting the verdict was that the
paraphernalia was found in defendant's bedroom which was "co-occupied by at least one
other person, who pled guilty to actual possession of the alleged contraband." Aplt. Brf. at
36.

Defendant's principal objection is the circumstantial nature of the evidence

demonstrating constructive possession. See Aplt. Brf. at 36, 38-39. Like the defendant in
Hopkins, defendant "apparently assumes that a lack of direct, physical evidence linking him
to the drugs and materials in [the] house constitutes a presumption of innocence on appeal."
Hopkins, 1999 UT 98, f 14. The Supreme Court rejected the defendant's claim in Hopkins,
holding that defendant ignored the testimony of three witnesses which supported the verdict.
Id. at t l 14-15.
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Here, defendant almost completely ignores the abundant evidence supporting his
conviction. For example, defendant fails to recognize that police found in his bedroom the
following items:
•

a propane bottle, two pencil torches, and a glass pipe lying on
defendant's bedroom floor, R. 216: 122;

•

a glass pipe, typically used for methamphetamine, R. 216:
102-03;

•

two more glass pipes which were burnt in a manner consistent
with smoking methamphetamine, R. 216: 119;

•

a cigarette lighter, a hand-made wood pipe, a washer, and
other brass items, R. 216: 120, 213-15;

•

two small soldering torches, R. 216:215-16;

•

a drill case containing two small scales which are commonly
used to weigh controlled substances, R. 216: 121-22; and

•

a glass bottle with a crystalline substance inside, two small
torches, and a magnifying glass in a gym bag, R. 216: 12L12

In addition, defendant does not acknowledge his own admissions of ownership to
several items of paraphernalia. Defendant incorrectly asserts that Jerry Wood testified that
I2

Defendant nominally challenges the court's admission of the paraphernalia on the
grounds that no foundation was laid to establish that it was found in defendant's bedroom.
Aplt. Brf. at 28. However, Officer Russell testified that police followed an established
search procedure. R. 216: 115. Upon finding evidence, members of the search team
notified Officer Russell, also on the scene, who then photographed the evidence where it
was found and recorded its location on an evidence log. R. 216: 115. Although
defendant elicited testimony suggesting that two fuel canisters were moved before being
photographed, Aplt. Brf. at 129-31, nothing in the record indicates that the procedure was
not followed with respect to the other evidence. Moreover, because defendant resided at
the residence, any evidence suggesting the evidence may have been moved goes to its
weight rather than to its admissibility.
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the butane torches belonged to Wood.13 See Aplt. Brf. at 38. When he was shown the
exhibit, Wood testified that he did not know whether or not they were his. R. 216: 226-27;
see also R. 216: 122, 166. Defendant fails to mention that Wood testified that he did not
keep any of his drugs or paraphernalia in the front bedroom, but that he kept them in his own
bedroom. R. 216: 228. On the other hand, defendant himself admitted ownership of the
bottle and torches as well as to the wood pipe. See R. 216: 211,213-15.14
Defendant also does not marshal the testimony that established the drug-related use
of the items seized, including:
•

an officer's testimony that propane bottles and pencil torches
are used to heat methamphetamine for inhalation, R. 216:122;

•

Jerry Wood's testimony that cigarette lighters and propane or
butane torches are used to heat methamphetamine, R. 216:
226;

•

an officer's testimony that the alleged knife handle was a
hand-made pipe, typical of those used for smoking drugs, R.
216:120;and

•

defendant's own testimony that the cigarette lighters and knife
handle could be used as "contraband," R. 215: 216;

13

Defendant cites to page 227 of the trial transcript which covers Wood's
testimony regarding State's Exhibit 8, consisting of a propane tank and two pencil
torches. See R. 216: 122, 166,226-27. Although defendant refers to a butane bottle in
his brief, the State assumes he is referencing the propane bottle and torches in State's
Exhibit 8.
I4

Defendant countered that the wood pipe was a knife handle rather than a pipe and
that he was making or using it as a "little hobby thing." See R. 216: 213-14.
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•

testimony from police, Jerry Wood, and defendant himself that
the glass pipes were of a kind commonly used to smoke
controlled substances, R. 216: 119,220,225-26,228-29;

•

police testimony that two of the glass pipes were burnt in a
manner consistent with smoking methamphetamine as were
the broken light bulbs. R.216: 118-19, 122-24.

•

testimony from Jerry Wood that cigarette lighters and butane
or propane torches are commonly used to heat up crystal
methamphetamine until it turns into a liquid and can be
inhaled. R. 216: 226,228-29; see also R. 216: 220; and

•

police testimony that the measuring scales were of a type
commonly used to weigh and separate controlled substances.
R. 216: 121-22; see also R. 216: 222.

Finally, defendant fails to acknowledge evidence of his own use of drugs at the time
of the search. Although he denied using drugs at the time, defendant admitted his past use
of drugs, including "meth, cocaine, [and] marijuana," R. 216: 212-13,220. Contrary to his
claim of only past use, Kim Sant testified that she had a "pretty good clue" defendant was
presently using methamphetamine or crank. R. 216:200. Moreover, ReNae Weakland, with
whom defendant shared the bedroom, testified that she and defendant used drugs together on
occasion. R.216: 190.
Defendant's failure to marshal the foregoing evidence precludes review by this Court
of his claim that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. Hopkins, 1999 UT 98,
TJ14. In any case, the evidence identified above, together with the admission of the baggie
containing methamphetamine residue, R. 216: 86-89, 116, 142, is more than sufficient to
support the jury verdict. In short, the evidence was not '"completely lacking or [ ] so slight
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and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust."' Heaps, 2000 UT
5,119, (quoting Child, 972 P.2d at 433).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the State respectfully requests that the Court affirm
defendant's conviction.
Respectfully submitted this 1~? day of March, 2000.
JAN GRAHAM
UTAH ATTORNEY GENERAL

IETWEY S. GRAY
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
Attorneys for Appellee, State of Utah
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the same to be [ ] hand delivered [^Lmailed, via first class mail, postage prepaid, to his
counsel of record, as follows:
WILLIAM B. PARSONS, III
440 East 3300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84115

Ssistant Attorney Gene:
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ADDENDA

Addendum A
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STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss

County of Tooele

)

AFFIDAVIT FOR SEARCH WARRANT
Before: William E. Pitt, Magistrate
The undersigned, David Fowler being first duly sworn deposes and says:
That I am a catagory one peace officer with the Tooele City Police Department and have
been a peace officer for over two years. I am presently assigned as a detective with said
Department.
That the affiant has reason to believe
That on the single family dwelling located at physical mailing address 171 North Fifth Street, Tooele,
Utah which is located on the West side of Fifth Street, more particularly described as a off-white
aluminum sided single family dwelling with a chain link fence.
1.

Controlled substances, primarily methamphetamine, and paraphernalia evidencing the
use, packaging, and storing of the same.

2,

Record keeping documents for the sales of controlled substances

3,

Scales for the weighing of controlled substances and packaging materials, in the form
of small plastic zip lock type baggies usually used in dividing the controlled
substances into individual use quantities.

4.

Chemicals and glass ware, heating items for the manufacturing of controlled
substances.

Which property consists of items or constitutes evidence of illegal conduct, possessed by a
person or entity who is a party to the illegal conduct.
Your affiant does believe that said evidence supports the charging of the occupants of the dwelling
with the crimes of Distribution of Controlled Substances, and Arranging to distribute a controlled
Substance, both of which are second degree felonies.
The facts to establish the grounds for issuance of a Search Warrant are:

Affidavit Supporting Search Warrant
Page 2

Police investigation conducted in part by your affiant personally reveals the following facts:
1.

Your affiant and Sgt. Roger Niesporek, and Deputy Stidham have obtained a
cooperation of a confidential informant who is being investigated for the commission
of a drug related offense, who has volunteered to make peace officer conducted and
observed buys of controlled substances from persons within Tooele County in
exchange for consideration in the lessoning of the offense for which the C. I. is being
investigated.

2.

The C.I. was stopped for a traffic offense, and gave consent to a search of her vehicle.
She had a hand bag which she was holding closely, which the officer also searched
pursuant to the C I.'s consent.

3.

Within the purse, was several syringes, a vile with wet cotton swabs, three small
baggies with a substance which the C.I. said was "crank". The C.I. was then arrested
for possession of controlled substance with intent to distribute. The C. I. told
Deputy Stidham she buys the "crank" which the C I. said she only buys to sell,
because the C I. uses crystle meth which is a better product.

4.

The C.I. was then interrogated at the Tooele City Police Department. The C. I.
informed your affiant that she was contacted personally by Gilbert Arvizo late
Wednesday, January 14,1998, who showed her several baggies of methamphetamine.
He was accompanied by a female who told the C.I. that she was cooking, and that
"they" will have some ready to sell "tomorrow" which is January 15, 1998.
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5.

The C.I. said she has purchased from Gilbert Arvizo in the past, and is confident that
he will have the substance for her. She then attempted a controlled buy under the
direction of your affiant and Sgt. Niesporek and Deputy Stidham, but was informed
that Gilbert was asleep and to call back later. Hence, your affiant stated that it is
assured that the controlled substance will be found upon the premises, because Gilbert
is there.

6.

Gilbert told the C.I. that he was now living Jerry Dale Wood at the above described
residence. Jerry Dale Wood is known as a drug user.

WHEREFORE, the affiant prays that a Search Warrant be issued for the seizure of said items
immediately upon the issuance of a warrant herein.
Your affiant requests that this warrant be served immediately, as the more time that passes
between the C I.'s arrest and the execution of the warrant, the more likely the target will discover that
the C.I. is arrested by the police, and the more likely the target will attempt to get rid of the
controlled substances.
Your affiant requests that this warrant be executed without prior notice as the target is a
violent person and the C.I. indicated he is always packing a firearm. Hence, the element of surprise
is important to the protection of the officers. In addition, if notice is given, the controlled substances
may be destroyed.

David Fowler, Affiant J
AFFIANT

*

Affidavit Supporting Search Warrant
Page 4

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN to before me this .* ;T""day of January, 1998.

y&&*. £jB*fr-

>Z*

Magistrate

Addendum B
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SEARCH WARRANT
COUNTY OF TOOELE, STATE OF UTAH
TO ANY PEACE OFFICER IN THE STATE OF UTAH
Proof by affidavit under oath having been made this day before me by David Fowler, I am
satisfied that there is probable cause to believe
That on the sThgTe family dwelling located at physical mailing address 171 North Fifth Street, Tooele,
Utah which is located on the West side of Fifth Street, more particularly described as a off-white
aluminum sided single family dwelling with a chain link fence.
1.

Controlled substances, primarily methamphetamine, and paraphernalia evidencing the
use, packaging, and storing of the same.

2.

Record keeping documents for the sales of controlled substances

3.

Scales for the weighing of controlled substances and packaging materials, in the form
of small plastic zip lock type baggies usually used in dividing the controlled
substances into individual use quantities.

4.

Chemicals and glass ware, heating items for the manufacturing of controlled
substances.

All of said property is evidence of illegal conduct in possession of a person or entity a party to the
illegal conduct and upon good cause being shown the court is convinced that the seizure cannot be
obtained by subpoena without the evidence being concealed, destroyed, damaged, or altered.
You are therefore commanded at any time during the day or night time to make a search of the abovenamed or described residence and any out buildings upon the premises, without prior notice of
execution of the warrant, for the herein-above described property or evidence and if you find the same
or any part thereof, to bring it forthwith before a judge of the Third District Court, County of Tooele,
State of Utah, or retain such property in your custody, subject to the order of said court.
GIVEN UNDER MY HAND and dated this /jTday of January, 1998.

Magistrate
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